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INTRODUCTION
Since the earliest days of the use of expert witnesses,' judges (and
more recently legislatures) have struggled to design the juridical inter-
section where law and science cross paths.2 The effort has not met
with notable success.3  This situation could be changing, however.
Throughout this Article, the phrase "expert witness" should be understood to refer to
expert witnesses offering testimony purportedly based on scientific knowledge, rather than the
many other sorts of expert witnesses that are possible. At the same time, it is important to
note that our discussion applies to all expert testimony premised upon purportedly scientific
methods. For example, California courts draw a distinction between expert testimony and
scientific evidence, see, e.g., People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 723-24 (Cal. 1984), as well as
between social science and natural science, see, e.g., People v. Stoll, 783 P.2d 698, 712-13 (Cal.
1989). Such distinctions are unsound as a matter of logic and practice. Moreover, neither the
Frye test, see Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), as interpreted by most
federal courts, nor the plain language of Article VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence, draws
these distinctions. Testimony derived from or premised upon purportedly scientific methods
should be assessed by the standards and principles of science. See David L. Faigman, To Have
and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EM-
ORY L.J. 1005, 1024-25 (1989).
2 Before the sixteenth century, experts usually were part of the jury. Once expert wit-
nesses became witnesses, it is not clear whether they were called by the parties or the court.
See John Basten, The Court Expert in Civil Trials-A Comparative Appraisal, 40 MOD. L.
REV. 174 (1977). The first clear reference to an expert witness called by and on behalf of a
party appears in the case of Folkes v. Chadd, 99 Eng. Rep. 589 (1782). See generally Learned
Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV.
40 (1901) (discussing the development of the use of expert witnesses).
3 Nearly a century ago, one observer summed up the state of expert testimony as it had
arrived to that point in history:
The position of an expert on the witness stand, who does not testify either to what
he has observed or knows as fact but expresses merely his opinion as to a situation
or on facts which have been established by other witnesses, is anomalous in Anglo-
Saxon law. It was to be expected that former generations of judges and lawyers
trained in older precedents and practices who recognized the appearance in the
courts of an expert witness as an innovation would look with suspicion and doubt
on such testimony. While the principles on which such evidence is introduced
have come to be well recognized and while the profession no longer has any reser-
vation in approving theoretically of the use of expert testimony, yet, on the other
hand, there is a constant complaining and mistrust on the part of judges, juries and
lawyers of the expert witness.
Lee M. Friedman, Expert Testimony, Its Abuse and Reformation, 19 YALE L.J. 247, 247
(1910). Others, writing in still earlier generations, have been less restrained. For example:
Many judges have expressed their thorough dissatisfaction with the prevalent
method . . . of making use of the services of experts in the conduct of judicial
inquiries .... [N]o judge has, in recent times, said aught in praise of the system, so
far as the writer has been able to observe. Law writers are equally condemnatory
of the system, and severe in their reflections upon the product of that system-the
expert.
Clemens Herschel, Services of Experts in the Conduct of Judicial Inquiries, 21 AM. L. REV.
571, 571-72 (1887);
(W]e think [expert testimony] should not be much encouraged and should be re-
ceived only in cases of necessity.... [The expert witnesses' views] cannot fail gener-
ally to be warped by a desire to promote the cause in which they are enlisted.
1800
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Last term, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,4 the
Supreme Court adopted a novel approach to the age-old problem of
scientific evidence. The -Court determined that the Federal Rules of
Evidence require scientific evidence to be scientifically valid before it
enters the courtroom. The Court has served notice that experts
should trade in their crystal balls for electron microscopes. But the
success of this move into the twentieth century largely depends on the
law's proper understanding of the crossroads at which law and sci-
ence meet. Becoming scientifically literate should prove to be a con-
tinuing challenge to the law.
The trial process seeks out expert testimony because the expert,
by definition, possesses knowledge that the judge and jury lack. With
the benefit of the expert's knowledge, the fact-finder's uncertainty
about facts at issue in a case might be reduced and decisions reached
more easily and accurately. But precisely because the expert's knowl-
edge is beyond the ken of the judge and jury, they are in a weak posi-
tion to evaluate whether what an expert is offering is genuine, valid,
and helpful. Case law is replete with examples of shady science and
shoddy scientists. This has made courts, at best, ambivalent about
their relationship with science. This ambivalence has led to profound
misunderstanding and great inconsistency in how the courts evaluate
scientific opinion.
The essential difficulty, courts well realize, is that they confront a
fundamental dilemma in this area. A court must not admit invalid
evidence, for to do so violates the fundamental principle of evidence
law that only relevant evidence may be admitted. Testimony that is
not valid is not relevant. At the same time, a court may not exclude
valid information, for to do so would violate the equally fundamental
principle that all relevant evidence is admissible.' The challenge to
the law, the one it has been struggling to meet, is to devise a test of
admissibility for scientific evidence that will present a green light to
genuine expert testimony and a red light to false or distorted offerings.
Of course, no filter will be free of error. Whatever rule is im-
posed, wherever the line is drawn, some good evidence will be ex-
cluded and some poor evidence will be admitted. Some tests will
produce more of the first type of error; other tests will produce more
Ferguson v. Hubbel, 97 N.Y. 507, 514 (1884) (emphasis added); and
[Medical expert witnesses come] with such a bias on their minds to support the
cause in which they are embarked, that hardly any weight should be given to their
evidence.
Id. at 514 (citing The Tracy Peerage, 10 Cl. & Fin. 154, 191 (1843)).
4 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
5 Unless a specific reason exists for excluding it.
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of the second type. A more refined goal, therefore, is to devise a test
that strikes the proper balance between erroneous admission and erro-
neous exclusion.
Solving the fundamental dilemma does not eliminate the difficul-
ties. A further problem is somehow to employ sufficient expertise or
procedural assistance on behalf of the fact-finder so that good use can
be made of valid scientific knowledge when it is received. Moreover,
one may ask if the difficulties are growing or whether they are remain-
ing proportional to the volume of cases. Although virtually everyone
seems to assume that more knowledge, more fields of expertise, more
client resources, and smarter lawyers must add up to more scien-
tific evidence offerings, more complexity, and more problems, no one
knows this for certain.6
This Article seeks to improve the choice and application of a
legal test by illuminating the nature of scientific knowledge. We be-
lieve that the law can best manage and use scientific expertise by ac-
commodating itself to the nature of the beast, an approach that has
rarely been pursued. Historically, courts have not taken the time to
examine, in all its complexity, the scientific enterprise. This Article
offers a glimpse into that enterprise and argues for a legal test of ad-
missibility that fully accounts for its complexity.
We begin with a sketch of the history of the law of admissibility
of scientific evidence, from the days before the much discussed and,
we believe, misunderstood Frye test7 to the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence (Part I). Then we discuss the issues confronted in
Daubert,8 the Supreme Court's only attempt to interpret the test of
admissibility embodied in the Federal Rules (Part II). We then offer a
conceptual analysis of the nature of both scientific knowledge and the
legal process in order to see where the overlooked connections might
be and to try to discern whether and how the intersection of law and
science might be further improved, so that both the admission and
exclusion of evidence will involve fewer errors (Part III).
6 And this has long been the view:
It has been said, with truth, that "the scientific expert is a product of an advanced
and rapidly advancing civilization; that he has acquired an immensely increased
importance, and a much wider field, and a far greater frequency of employment by
the recent marvellous advances in the applications of science,-applications which
have increased the sphere of things to be litigated about."
William L. Foster, Expert Testimony,-Prevalent Complaints and Proposed Remedies, II
HARV. L. REV. 169, 176 (1897-98) (quoting an unidentified source).
7 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
8 113 S. Ct. at 2786.
1802 [Vol. 15:1799
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I. THE ADMISSION OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN AMERICAN LAW
A. The Test Before Frye: Acceptance in the Commercial
Marketplace
Modem discussions of the test for admitting scientific evidence
almost always begin with Frye v. United States-the "general accept-
ance" test-decided in 1923.9 But science-good, bad, and pseudo-
began long before 1923, as did the testimony of good, bad, and
pseudoexperts. The courts before 1923 must have had some ideas
about when such experts were to be permitted to testify. Moreover,
like most law, the Frye test can be understood best in the light of what
existed before it. For these reasons we begin our brief history well
before Frye v. United States. From at least the middle of the nine-
teenth century until Frye-perhaps, indeed, until the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975-the general rule for the admissi-
bility of expert testimony remained fairly stable.
The basic test consisted of the determination whether an expert
was "qualified" before the expert's testimony could be admitted. If
the witness was an expert, then his or her opinion testimony was "en-
titled" to be admitted as evidence (given, of course, its apparent rele-
vance to the issues to be determined at trial).'0 A more sophisticated
version of this pre-Frye test focused first on the nature of the subject
matter at issue and whether that subject matter was beyond the range
of knowledge of the average juror. If so, a qualified expert's opinion
was considered to be helpful, if not essential, to the jury's determina-
tion of facts at issue." As stated by one commentator in 1880:
The practice of the courts is to admit the testimony of a class
of witnesses who are not supposed to have personal knowledge of
any facts or circumstances bearing upon a pending case, but on the
assumption that they are able from their special training and expe-
rience to apply scientific tests and present to the court and jury the
import and value of such evidence as may appear, which laymen
could not be expected to comprehend and properly estimate.12
9 See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Frye test.
10 Albert S. Osborn, Reasons and Reasoning in Expert Testimony, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Oct. 1935, at 488, 489. Conditioning the admission of expert testimony on nothing
more than the expert's "qualifications" went on before Frye, after Frye, after the Federal
Rules, and perhaps will continue after Daubert. See generally Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissi-
bility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 1197, 1210 (1980).
'I The "helpfulness" element of admissibility is still present today in the Federal Rules of
Evidence. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702 (expert can testify if it "will assist the trier of fact")
(emphasis added).
12 John B. Chapin, Experts and Expert Testimony, 22 ALB. L.J. 365, 365 (1880).
1803
HeinOnline  -- 15  Cardozo L. Rev.  1803 1993 - 1994
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1799
Expertise was implied from the expert's success in an occupation
or profession which embraced that knowledge. If a person could
make a living selling his knowledge in the marketplace, then presuma-
bly expertise existed.' 3 Although courts sometimes spoke of an ex-
pert's "greater study respecting certain subjects" or having "made the
subject upon which he gives his opinion a matter of particular
study," 14 it seems clear that a modicum of prosperity in the practice
of the occupation or profession possessing that knowledge almost al-
ways accompanied the expertise. In effect, the marketplace deter-
mined whether valid knowledge existed by endowing it with commer-
cial value. This is not a point that courts made explicitly, but it seems
to be implicit in the courts' determinations of who was "qualified.' 1 5
On the one hand, this seems practical enough. What better cru-
cible for testing expertise than the everyday world of life's activities,
with stakes as great or greater than those at issue in trials, and deci-
sions reflected in consumers' hard-earned dollars? Buyers with prac-
tical needs would have ample opportunity to assess and compare the
knowledge that was for hire, and they would choose what was valid
and useful and reject what was not. Knowledge that proved valuable
13 The Authors, therefore, refer to this as the "commercial marketplace test."
14 Jones v. Tucker, 41 N.H. 546, 548 (1860).
15 Consider three examples from the middle of the nineteenth century. Chief Justice Lem-
uel Shaw, writing in New England Glass Co. v. Lovell, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 319 (1851), stated:
It is not because a man has a reputation for superior sagacity, and judgment, and
power of reasoning, that his opinion is admissible; if so, such men might be called
in all cases, to advise the jury, and it would change the mode of trial. But it is
because a man's professional pursuits, his peculiar skill and knowledge in some
department of science, not common to men in general, enable him to draw an
inference, where men of common experience, after all the facts proved, would be
left in doubt.
Id. at 321.
Chief Justice Ames, writing in Buffum v. Harris, 5 R.I. 243 (1858), affirming a lower
court decision to admit the opinions of two civil engineers, a well digger, a farmer, and a
gardener in an action on the case to recover damages for interference with the flow of water
from a natural spring on plaintiff's property said:
Indeed, knowledge of any kind, gained for and in the course of one's business as
pertaining thereto, is precisely that which entitles one to be considered an expert,
so as to render his opinion, founded on such knowledge, admissible in evidence.
Id. at 251.
Or, as stated by the Supreme Court of Maine in Clark v. Rockland Water Power Co., 52
Me. 68 (1860):
The foundation on which expert testimony rests, is the supposed superior knowl-
edge or experience of the expert in relation to the subject matter upon which he is
permitted to give an opinion as evidence. This knowledge must be such as is pecu-
liar to persons of skill and experience in some particular branch of business, or
department of science, which is the subject of investigation, and not of such a
character as to be open and common to all persons.
Id. at 77.
1804
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under such a test could hardly be without worth in a courtroom.
What was good enough for the marketplace was good enough for the
courtroom.
But though it might be practical and easily administered, the test
of commercial value is a poor one. Its major weaknesses are perhaps
more obvious today than they were a century or two ago. The market
not only selects for validity, it selects also for entertainment, desire,
wishful thinking, hope, sometimes even desperation. These are not
without their value, but they are not good proxies for what courts are
looking for in expert testimony. If the marketplace approves, as it
does, of astrologers, sellers of phony cancer cures, and guides to new
age vortexes, are those therefore good enough to provide guidance in
a courtroom? The marketplace test is incapable of distinguishing as-
trophysics from astrology.' 6
A second problem is that some fields have little or no life in any
commercial marketplace. Indeed, in the past century, some fields
have come into being that have no function outside of their possible
courtroom utility.' 7 The courtroom is their marketplace.
Finally, the marketplace test entirely conflates the expert and the
expertise.' 8 Before the twentieth century, courts apparently never
considered the question of whether a body of asserted knowledge ex-
isted, and could be validated, separate from the "qualified expert"
who "possessed" it. The expert and the knowledge were treated as
one. If an expert were "qualified," then an expertise existed.' 9 But
being a "qualified expert" presupposes that an expertise exists in
which one may have become expert.
These last two problems are the ones that demanded of the Frye
court at least a slightly new solution.
B. The Frye Corollary: Acceptance in the Intellectual Marketplace
The defendant in Frye v. United States, James Alphonso Frye,
proffered the results from an early form of polygraph testing, the
"systolic blood pressure deception test," as evidence in support of his
plea of innocence to a charge of murder.
This was an unfamiliar problem for the court. How was the va-
16 The Frye test also cannot distinguish between science and pseudoscience; after all, astro-
logical forecasts are "generally accepted" in the "pertinent field" of astrology.
17 Some of these have been appropriately gathered under the heading of forensic sciences,
and they include the identification of firearms, handwriting, tiremarks, fibers, toolmarks, and
so on.
18 So have many courts right up to the present time. See, e.g., Giannelli, supra note 10.
19 See Osborn, supra note 10, at 489.
1805
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lidity of such asserted expertise to be assessed and a judgment made
as to its admissibility as evidence? The technique was new. Perhaps
it was valid, perhaps not. There were, as yet, no polygraphers and no
developed market for their services. There might never be, if the only
place that had any use for them was the courtroom, and if the only
way to get into the courtroom was to gain prior marketplace accept-
ance.20 An intelligent and fair-minded judge would realize that a
novel scientific question presented itself, and that in this case, the con-
ventional test offered no ready solution.21 The asserted expertise of-
fered in Frye demanded of the court a different test than the one that
had served the law for so long.
Like most good common law judges, however, Judge Van Orsdel
found a solution that departed as little as possible from prior law.
The whole of the Frye opinion took up only two pages of the Federal
Reporter. The critical words are these:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to de-
fine. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized sci-
entific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction
is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general ac-
ceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. 22
In one sense, this is nothing more than the familiar market test
relocated into a different marketplace. Where there is no commercial
market, and may never be one, the evaluation of the asserted expertise
can be performed in the "field's" marketplace by those who trade
there. The intellectual or professional marketplace was simply a
proxy for the commercial marketplace. The test is still a marketplace
20 Although courts today rarely admit polygraph expert testimony, and then only upon
stipulation of the parties, polygraph testing has found commercial value in police investigation,
pre-employment screening, aperiodic testing, and national security protective work. It remains
controversial. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, OTA-TM-H-15, SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY
OF POLYGRAPH TESTING: A RESEARCH REVIEW AND EVALUATION (1983).
21 The court in Frye may have had a second problem. Suppose it wanted to exclude the lie
detection results, then and thereafter, even if some day such examiners did attain a commercial
market and qualified polygraphers were plentiful. (The most obvious reason a court might feel
this way is that polygraph testing could become a major vehicle by which at least some defend-
ants could make a jury feel there is reasonable doubt about guilt.) Such exclusion would not be
easy in a legal world which, despite "constant complaining and mistrust" of experts, routinely
admitted them-so long as they were "qualified." And William Marston, Frye's expert wit-
ness, was well qualified by conventional standards (if he actually had an expertise in the subject
at issue). Marston was an attorney and research psychologist who had done a considerable
amount of empirical research on the physiological correlates of lying. See William M. Mar-
ston, Systolic Blood Pressure Symptoms of Deception, 2 J. ExP. PSYCH. 117 (1917).
22 Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
1806 [Vol. 15:1799
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test, the real evaluation still is conducted outside of the court or the
law, and it still is incapable of distinguishing astrology from astro-
physics.
Yet the Frye corollary did some new things. First, it separated
the expertise from the expert, thereby creating legal accommodation
to the notion that a body of asserted knowledge has an existence sepa-
rate from any individual, no matter how brilliant, well educated, or
experienced that person might be, and that the body of asserted
knowledge had to be evaluated apart from any and every individual
who might seek to bring it to court. Second, of course, the alternative
marketplace-the intellectual marketplace-allows more knowledge
to be assessed, even if the knowledge is too new to be marketed com-
mercially or if there is no hope of ever marketing it commercially.
Third-and most remarkable-Frye replaced buyers with sellers
as assessors of the validity of what was being offered. 23 The commer-
cial marketplace test, even with its serious weaknesses, had the virtue
of allowing buyers in the marketplace to be the authority on whether
something was valuable and, "therefore," valid. Under the Frye vari-
ation, that control was passed to the people who produced the knowl-
edge and offered it (and, in a sense, offered themselves) to the courts.2 4
23 The courts' placing themselves, now, at the mercy of the sellers of knowledge has an-
other implication. While buyers may have more or less constant standards, or adjust their
standards to their needs, different fields have widely varying standards. Some fields have a
tradition of vigorous debate, data gathering, hypothesis testing, an ethos consistent with the
scientific enterprise. In these fields, an idea does not become generally accepted until it passes
a rigorous gauntlet of testing. Other fields lack these traditions of research, empirical testing,
and debate, and accept ideas into their catalog of generally accepted knowledge with far less
scrutiny. (Important examples of the latter fields are many of the forensic identification sci-
ences.) See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational
Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise," 137 U. PA. L. REv. 731
(1989); Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, What DNA "Fingerprinting" Can Teach the
Law About the Rest of Forensic Science, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 361 (1991); I.W. Evett,
Criminalistics: The Future of Expertise, 33 J. FOREN SIC SCI. Soc'Y 173 (1993). The courts
have difficulty telling one of these fields from another. Indeed, and especially ironically for
courts, they may mistake vigorous research and debate over the meaning of the findings for
lack of agreement (rather than the process of reaching trustworthy findings) and the lack of
research and debate as a sign of consensus (rather than a sign of an immature or retarded
science).
In any event, under the Frye variant, because the courts have to rely on the standards set
within each field, by definition they will find themselves accepting more readily the offerings of
less rigorous fields and less readily accepting the offerings of the more rigorous fields. Fields
that set higher thresholds will place a smaller proportion of their knowledge over the
threshold.
24 While this might strike some readers as an odd or even dangerous relocation of the
power to make important judgments, it was entirely consistent with one of the defining notions
of professionalism that was alive in that period and for some time thereafter: to be a profession
is to hold a monopoly of judgment over what constitutes your field's expertise, and in many
respects the courts have been deferential to the claims of other professions. See generally SAM-
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But in the main, the Frye test was a minor adaptation of a major
theme. The major theme was so nearly universal, so long established,
so much a part of the courts' woodwork, that it did not even need a
name. It simply was what the courts did. For most kinds of expertise
in most circumstances, the larger doctrine and the special situation
would lead to the same result. So unimportant was the Frye corollary
that it went unnoticed for decades. No contemporary law review arti-
cles were written about it, commentators ignored it, and other courts
did not cite it.25 In fact, Frye only became "trendy" in the 1970s as an
argument arose over the admissibility of scientific evidence, perhaps
in anticipation of the new Federal Rules.26
Though of little importance at the time it was decided, and
barely noticed for decades afterwards, the Frye test eventually became
the icon for one of the dominant notions of the proper criterion for
the admissibility of scientific evidence-general acceptance within its
field. The larger theme of marketplace acceptance was swallowed by
its corollary.
Frye may have become the icon for several reasons. Foremost,
perhaps, it was easy to apply and required little scientific sophistica-
tion on the part of judges. Moreover, the controversial cases were
from the subset of scientific evidence cases that Frye was designed to
deal with: asserted new knowledge that lacked an established clien-
tele. To established fields of endeavor-to old "knowledge"-the
courts implicitly applied the old marketplace notions: if one were a
card-carrying member of a recognized occupation or profession, one's
proffered expert testimony was admitted and the validity of the under-
lying knowledge was assumed." Finally, by the middle of the twenti-
UEL HABER, THE QUEST FOR AUTHORITY AND HONOR IN THE AMERICAN PROFESSIONS,
1750-1900 (1991); RONALD M. PAVALKO, SOCIOLOGY OF OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS
(2d ed. 1988).
25 Frye was not cited by a single other court, federal or state, for a decade. During the first
quarter century after its publication, Frye was cited in eight federal cases and five state cases.
During its second quarter century, it was cited fifty-four times in federal cases and twenty-nine
times in state cases. By the 1980s, it was being cited as much each year as it had been in its
first fifty years added together. What seems apparent from counting case citations is that
judicial interest in the Frye test did not pick up until a few years before the promulgation of the
Federal Rules of Evidence and thereafter, no doubt stimulated by the drafting and adoption of
the Federal Rules themselves.
26 See Paul C. Giannelli, Frye v. United States-Background Paper Prepared for the Na-
tional Conference of Lawyers and Scientists, 99 F.R.D. 189, 191 (1983); J.E. Starts, "A Still-
Life Watercolor": Frye v. United States, 27 J. FORENSIC SCi. 684, 685 (1982).
27 Yet, some portion of the "knowledge" of established fields is invalid. For example,
many accepted medical techniques have been found, after finally being subjected to rigorous
empirical testing, to be no better than or worse than less well-accepted treatments or no treat-
ment at all. See John P. Gilbert et al., Progress in Surgery and Anesthesia: Benefits and Risks
1808 [Vol. 15:1799
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eth century, the distinction between experts and expertise had grown
more apparent, even to courts. Not only did new fields or new spe-
cializations arise, but old fields acquired and offered distinct new
knowledge. New knowledge was sometimes put before courts in a
form more abstracted and isolated from the people who presented it.
Frye had been designed to fit just these kinds of situations.2"
C. The Federal Rules
In 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence offered another major test
for the admissibility of expert testimony, and most states made the
Federal Rules their own. Under the Federal Rules, in order to be
admissible, scientific expert testimony, like any evidence, first had to
be relevant.2 9 In addition, it had to satisfy Rule 702:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will as-
sist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise.3°
By its terms, the Federal Rules test,a" and the Advisory Commit-
tee's comment on it, give no hint of the Frye criterion;3 2 instead, the
rule appears to call for some sort of heightened relevancy test. The
increased threshold is set by the condition that to be admissible, the
judge must be persuaded that the testimony "will assist the trier of
fact."
Nevertheless, a majority of federal circuits and most states im-
ported the Frye concept into the Federal Rules test.3 The situation
of Innovative Therapy, in COSTS, RISKS, AND BENEFITS OF SURGERY 124 (John P. Bunker et
al. eds., 1977).
28 For further discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the Frye test, see infra part
II.B.2.
29 See FED. R. EVID. 401, 402.
30 FED. R. EvID. 702.
31 By which we mean the test embodied in Rule 702.
32 See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 282
(1973) [hereinafter Rules].
33 At least seven circuits have held that judicial use of Frye is allowable under the Federal
Rules of Evidence. See Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1115-16 (5th
Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (expert testimony failed to meet Frye test), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280
(1992); United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 60 & n.7 (8th Cir. 1990) (refusing to reject use
of Frye in evaluating "the admissibility of any questionable opinion evidence"), reh'g granted,
vacated (en banc), and remanded, 925 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Smith, 869
F.2d 348, 351 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[T]his Circuit has continued to affirm (and to apply) the Frye
standard."); Kropinski v. World Plan Executive Council-U.S., 853 F.2d 948, 956 (D.C. Cir.
1988) ("We have recently held that 'Frye is still the law in this Circuit.' ") (citing United States
v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 59-61 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817 (1987)); United States v.
Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475, 481-82 (9th Cir. 1988) (therapist testimony did not satisfy Frye stan-
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provided an interesting paradox. The rules were widely regarded as
having been intended to open the courthouse door to scientific expert
witnesses somewhat wider than Frye had.34 Yet, a majority of juris-
dictions held that general acceptance still was required.
The conventional view 5 that Frye sets a higher threshold for ad-
missibility is an erroneous one. Whether Frye or the Federal Rules
constitute the more rigorous test of admissibility depends on certain
features of the proffered knowledge. For example, Frye likely would
be a trustworthy filter when the asserted knowledge is relatively new
and the field or fields that provide the knowledge have traditions of
vigorous research, testing, and debate. Scientific issues that might be
in this category would include the toxicity of substances, the psychol-
ogy of memory, and the identification of chemicals. This is not to say
that the Federal Rules test would necessarily be less rigorous, but the
responsibility would be on the court to evaluate the validity of the
knowledge, and a considerable burden that is. It is no surprise that
many judges would prefer to rely on the expert's field to do it for
them.
On the other hand, the Frye test is much weaker than the Federal
Rules test when the knowledge is provided by fields that lack tradi-
tions of vigorous research, testing, and debate. Scientific issues that
might be in this category would include most psychological syn-
dromes3 6 and most of the forensic identification sciences.
If a field or fields external to courts are to decide the validity of
various propositions, the success of the enterprise is going to depend
on how well equipped those fields are to subject the issue to rigorous
dard); United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195, 1203 (6th Cir. 1985) (" '[This circuit] still
predicate[s] the admission of scientific evidence on general acceptance in the community.' ")
(quoting 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
702[03], at 702-17 to 702-18 (1985) (footnotes and citations omitted)), cert. denied, 477 U.S.
906 (1986); Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 304 n. 15 (4th Cir. 1984) (contin-
uing to recognize the validity of Frye test but limiting its use under certain circumstances).
In contrast, two other circuits have held that the Frye test is incompatible with the expert
testimony provisions. See United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 794-97 (2d Cir.) (rejecting
any use of Frye), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224,
1232-37 (3d Cir. 1985) (concluding that Frye "should be rejected as an independent controlling
standard of admissibility").
34 Though a widely shared perception, the reading of Frye as more restrictive than the
Federal Rules is overly simplistic, as we show infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
35 See, e.g., United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993) (describing Frye test as
"austere" and the Federal Rules of Evidence test as "liberal" regarding the admissibility of
scientific evidence); People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976); PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S
REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991); Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo's Retort:
Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637 (1993).
36 See, e.g., David L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A
Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619 (1986).
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examination and whether they have in fact subjected the question to
rigorous examination. Even rigorous fields cannot test everything,
and a lot of their knowledge slips into general acceptance without
careful examination. This is especially likely to be true of knowledge
that has been widely accepted for a considerable time.37 Thus, the
Frye test will only be effective sometimes. Courts that wish to rely on
Frye should first satisfy themselves that the field to which they are
deferring is capable of doing, and has in fact done, the necessary eval-
uation. Otherwise, such courts would be deceiving themselves.
The current popular view is that a growing and unprecedented
mass of "junk science" is being admitted into evidence. This view has
been most exuberantly and popularly expressed through numerous
anecdotes by Peter Huber in his book, Galileo's Revenge.38 Various
commissions, committees, task forces, and educational programs for
judges have been formed, rule changes proposed, and litigation under-
taken aiming to modify or reinforce stronger rules to hold back the
tides of junk. It was in this environment that the Supreme Court
agreed at last to interpret the Federal Rules in Daubert.
II. THE ISSUES RAISED BY DAUBERT V. MERRELL Dow
The most recent step in the design and redesign of the courts'
37 Philip H. Abelson, The Need for Skepticism, 138 SCIENCE 75 (1962) (noting the long-
held myth that noble gases did not combine).
38 HUBER, supra note 35. Huber's entertaining book may be right or it may be wrong
about the alleged upsurge of unreliable scientific testimony. Unfortunately, he does not ad-
vance our knowledge on the question because his own methodology is a form of junk social
science (that is, he uses no systematic empirical evidence or analysis, merely anecdotes). See
generally Chesebro, supra note 35.
On some important matters, Huber simply is incorrect. First, the problem is by no means
a new one. Rather than being, as he calls it, a "landmark ruling," HUBER, supra note 35, at
14, the Frye test, supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text, was a minor variation on long-
established evidentiary doctrine governing the admission of scientific evidence. Nor is it true
that following the decision in Frye, "federal courts, widely copied by the states, were bound by
the Frye rule." HUBER, supra note 35, at 14. Frye was not followed in droves but was long
ignored, perhaps because it was Frye that was following what courts, for the most part, already
did. Moreover, as a matter of elementary jurisprudence, only a single court was "bound" by
Frye, and that was the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Finally,
Huber attributes the problem of junk science to the demise of Frye in the wake of the Federal
Rules. Id. at 15-16. He gives no evidence beyond his assertion. His causal attribution may be
doubted if only because judges and lawyers had bemoaned the real or supposed problem of
junk science loudly and clearly for at least a century-before and after Frye, and before and
after the Federal Rules-and because most courts, state and federal, treated the Federal Rules
as if they embodied a general acceptance test. (The Supreme Court has now made clear that
they do not. See infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.) Huber also does not explain why
Frye is supposedly better than the Federal Rules, or how theories become "generally ac-
cepted." His underlying thesis seems to be that when "conventional" scientists say a theory is
valid, it must be valid. This does not get the law much beyond question-begging.
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law-science intersection occurred on June 28, 1993, when the United
States Supreme Court announced its decision in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ,9 and for the first time interpreted the test
of the Federal Rules for the admission of scientific expert testimony.
A. Frye's Demise
The first question the Daubert Court addressed was whether the
general acceptance test of Frye had survived the enactment of the
Federal Rules. On this seemingly basic question the Rules and their
history are silent. The Advisory Committee's Notes,4° the congres-
sional committee reports, 41 and the hearings on the Federal Rules
42
do not address the issue. Judge Weinstein has stated that the "silence
of the rule[s] and its drafters may arguably be regarded as tantamount
to an abandonment of the general acceptance standard. ' 43 He further
argues that the "[e]limination of the Frye test is consistent with the
underlying policies of Article VII."
Some commentators disagree with Judge Weinstein's view.45
Although Professors Louisell, Mueller, and Graham criticize the Frye
standard, they conclude that it survived enactment of the Rules. It
was the only standard in common use and the Rules invite (if not
require) some standard. Furthermore, it has been argued that imposi-
tion of the Frye test provides a method by which courts can assess the
validity of novel scientific information and safeguards the jury against
possibly specious expert testimony.46
When interpreting the Federal Rules, the Court has steadfastly
refused to consult, at least explicitly, the common law prior to their
39 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
40 The Committee's Notes appear throughout the Federal Rules. See Rules, supra note 32,
at 183.
41 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7098; S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051;
H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075.
42 Proposed Rules of Evidence." Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Federal
Rules of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
43 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 702[03],
at 702-36 (1993).
44 Id.; see also 22 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 5169 (1978 & Supp. 1993) (concluding that Frye was repealed by the
Federal Rules).
45 See, e.g., MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 703.2 (3d ed.
1991); 1 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 105, at
818 (1977).
46 United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1985).
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enactment. Instead, the Court employs the plain-meaning standard in
its construction of the Rules. This standard "requires courts to en-
force a statute's literal language unless the legislative history ... in-
tended another meaning. ' 4  The Daubert Court read the "plain"
language of Rule 702 and its statutory history to mean that the Frye
test is not incorporated in the Rules. Neither the Frye test nor the
concept of "general acceptance" appears in the text of Article VII.
Although nearly twenty years had passed since the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and most circuit courts somehow had
"found" Frye in those Rules, the Supreme Court in Daubert found
that nothing in the language or history of the Federal Rules gives any
suggestion that Frye or the general acceptance concept had become
part of the Federal Rules, and since the Rules occupy the field, the
Court held that the Frye test was superseded by them. 8 Justice
Blackmun buried Frye succinctly: "[T]he assertion that the Rules
somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing. ' 49
B. The Standard for Admissibility Under the Federal Rules
Although the standard for admissibility of scientific evidence
under Article VII of the Federal Rules is often described as a "rele-
vancy test," such a limited characterization constitutes a mere redun-
dancy. Rule 401 already requires, as a threshold matter, that all
evidence be relevant to be admitted. Rule 702 focuses the relevancy
requirement on the scientific merit of the evidence and expressly man-
dates that the scientific information "assist the trier of fact."50 In gen-
eral, under the Rules all relevant evidence is admitted and the oppo-
nent of the evidence bears the burden to provide a good reason to
4' Randolph N. Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of
Evidence, 68 TEX. L. REV. 745, 746 (1990). In several recent cases the Court has adhered
strictly to a plain-meaning approach to interpreting the Rules. See Huddleston v. United
States, 485 U.S. 681, 687 (1988); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 179-81 (1987). But
see Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stat-
ing that the Court will go beyond the plain meaning when "a statute which, if interpreted
literally, produces an absurd, and perhaps unconstitutional, result"); see also Glen Weis-
senberger, The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53
OHIO ST. L.J. 1307 (1992) (arguing that application of legislative intent is misplaced in the
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
48 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
,49 Id.
5o Of course, Rule 702 is not limited to the scientific context, for it also applies to "techni-
cal or other specialized knowledge." The present discussion is limited to the scientific context
because that is the nature of the expertise offered here. Nonscientific expertise presents many
similar problems, as well as many special ones, that space does not allow us to consider. See
generally CHARLES T. MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 13 (Edward W.
Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
1813
HeinOnline  -- 15  Cardozo L. Rev.  1813 1993 - 1994
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1799
exclude it.5 In some instances, however, as with hearsay, more is
needed to admit the evidence. "[M]ultiple ways exist to interpret
what more is needed under Article VII. ' '52
1. The Expert's Qualifications
Rule 702 plainly requires that the proffered expert be "qualified."
As discussed above, the qualifications test has long been a favorite of
judges, and many continue to employ this test up to the present.5 3
But Article VII plainly demands more.54 Judges who merely check
qualifications defer to whatever the witness thinks is valid science55 or
to the professional guilds to decide what scientific evidence to admit.
Admissibility of scientific evidence thus becomes a guild issue re-
solved not by legal principle, nor on the basis of the accuracy of the
information, but instead by the internal politics of professional organi-
zations.56 But failure to query more than qualifications at the court-
house door leads inevitably to the admission of invalid science.
The Court in Daubert paid no explicit attention to the possibility
that an expert's qualifications alone might provide the additional as-
surance of validity called for by Rule 702, though the opinion refers
several times to the credentials of the experts who testified at trial in
51 This is the lesson of Rule 403 which mandates that relevant evidence is excluded under
the rule only if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
52 Brief for a Group of American Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither
Party, Daubert (No. 92-102). In their petition for certiorari, the Daubert petitioners raised
"the issue of the power of lower federal courts under Rule 402's mandate that all relevant
evidence is admissible unless excluded pursuant to another rule. We do not disagree with the
proposition that Rule 402 was intended to restrict the federal courts' common law making
power over the rules of evidence." Id.; see 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 44, § 5192.
However, regarding the interpretation of Rule 702, the principal question of concern here,
Rule 402 provides little guidance. Rule 702, after all, is one of those "other rules" that re-
stricts the admission of "relevant evidence." See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224,
1235 (3d Cir. 1985) ("[T]he notes of the advisory committee make clear that Rule 402 is
limited by Fed. R. Evid. 403 and by the rules contained in Article VII ... including Rule
702.").
53 See supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also Giannelli, supra note 10, at 1210;
John W. Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F.
1, 9 ("Essentially the only obstacle to the admission of general propositions through the me-
dium of 'expert testimony' is the requirement that the qualifications of the expert be estab-
lished, i.e., that the expert be shown to be one.").
54 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The "Bases" of Expert Testimony. The Syllogistic Structure
of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1, 14 (1988).
55 The situation gets even worse in cases where minimally-trained technicians or police
officers are admitted as "experts" on using sophisticated scientific techniques of which they
have little or no understanding. Eg., City of Abilene v. Hall, 451 P.2d 188 (Kan. 1969) (testi-
mony based on gas chromatography allowed even though "expert" who conducted the test
conceded lacking knowledge of why or how the machine and technique worked).
56 See Faigman, supra note 1, at 1086; Comment, The Psychologist as Expert Witness, 38
MD. L. REV. 539, 563-64 (1979).
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the case.57 Contrary to the practices of the most liberal courts as well
as to some state statutes,5" the opinion gives every indication that
such a view is not worth discussing because it is beyond the pale.
Given the test the Court does find in Rule 702, s9 admissibility condi-
tioned on a witness's credentials alone would have to be viewed as an
absurdity.
2. General Acceptance
The Daubert Court banished the general acceptance test 6° from
the Federal Rules with the same language it used to spurn Frye. De-
spite this repudiation, lower courts might turn to general acceptance
in order to fulfill their responsibilities under the validity test of
Daubert.6 t Unconditional reliance on the general acceptance test,
however, is inadvisable, especially given the severe criticism it has re-
ceived from courts and commentators.62
The vagueness of the general acceptance test renders it suscepti-
ble to manipulation and tends to obscure the relevant inquiry.63 Since
the test serves as a proxy for determining the validity64 of the scientific
method, technique, or opinion in question, its utility must be evalu-
ated on the basis of its success in this capacity.
57 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791.
58 IOWA CODE ANN. § 691.2 (West 1993) (making the testimony of the state's forensic
scientists automatically admissible based on the mere fact that they are employees of the state's
bureau of criminal identification).
59 See infra part II.B.3 and accompanying text.
60 The general acceptance standard, as employed by most courts claiming to be following
Frye, is applied to the scientific methodology used rather than the specific conclusions derived
from that methodology. But see infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text. As the court in
Ibn-Tamas v. United States emphasized, the relevant inquiry concerns "the general acceptance
of a particular methodology in the field, not ... on the subject matter studied." 407 A.2d 626,
638 (D.C. 1979). Even so, the admitting court, of course, still must check that the generally
accepted method was actually employed to obtain the proffered results.
61 The usual justification for the general acceptance test is that "those most qualified to
assess the general validity of a scientific method will have the determinative voice." United
States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In People v. Barbara, the relevant
scientific community was described as a "technical jury" which passes on the scientific validity
of a procedure before it is admitted. 255 N.W.2d 171, 194 (Mich. 1977).
62 See generally United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1235-37 (3d Cir. 1985).
63 Id. at 1236; see also supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
64 Courts use the term "reliability" to refer loosely to what scientists separate into validity
and reliability. Unfortunately, the use of different terms injects unnecessary confusion into the
debate. We use the standard scientific definition of validity so as to create some consistency
across the law and science frontiers; this area of the law would be substantially assisted if
lawyers and scientists began using the same vocabulary. Given these precise and well-settled
terms of art in science, we believe the law's usage should conform to them.
"Validity" refers to the ability of a scientific test to measure what it purports to measure;
"reliability" refers to the ability of a scientific test to obtain consistent results. See Giannelli,
supra note 10, at 1201 n.20. The pertinent question for admissibility is validity, as emphasized
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The general acceptance test suffers from several fundamental
weaknesses. It often is criticized as overly conservative, for it imposes
a protracted waiting period that valid scientific evidence and tech-
niques must endure before gaining legal acceptance. 65 Another weak-
ness of the general acceptance test concerns the problem of ascertain-
ing when a scientific proposition has been generally accepted.66 There
are no standards defining the "pertinent field" to be consulted and
nothing in the test to establish what proportion of experts constitutes
"general acceptance."167
Courts have had considerable difficulty defining the "pertinent
field" in which to assess the scientific information because it often
extends into more than one academic or professional discipline.68
Compounding this problem is that each field may contain one or more
subspecialties. 69 Although general acceptance often is thought to be
the most conservative test of admissibility, in practice it often results
in the most liberal standards for admission. 7° The more narrowly a
court defines the pertinent field, the more agreement it is likely to
find.71 Even tea leaf reading is generally accepted if the pertinent field
consists of practicing tea leaf readers. The general acceptance test
thus degenerates into a process of counting noses.72 Depending on
how the court defines the pertinent field, the count ends up being
overinclusive or underinclusive. Because the pertinent field can be so
readily manipulated, the test by itself provides little bulwark against
shoddy science.
in Daubert. ("In a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon
scientific validity." 113 S. Ct. at 2795 n.9.)
Consider the example of handwriting identification. In a proficiency test sponsored by the
Forensic Sciences Foundation, handwriting experts unanimously agreed on the solution to a
handwriting identification problem (100% reliability), but all of them reached an incorrect
result (0% validity). See Risinger et al., supra note 23, at 737.
65 See I LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 45, at 821-22; Giannelli, supra note 10, at
1223; see also Addison, 498 F.2d at 743.
66 See Strong, supra note 53, at 10-11.
67 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1117 (1979).
68 Giannelli, supra note 10, at 1208.
69 Id. at 1209.
70 In addition to what follows, see the discussion supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
71 See Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198 (noting that "[s]election of the 'relevant scientific com-
munity,' appears to influence the result"); see also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, ON
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VOICE IDENTIFICATION (1979) (in which a group composed
of acoustical engineers, physiologists, statisticians, and others gave a less favorable assessment
of the technique than the narrower range of developers of the technique).
72 DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 955 (3d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 691 (1994).
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3. Preliminary Judicial Evaluation of Proffered Scientific Evidence
Under Rule 104(a)
After rejecting a qualifications test and the general acceptance
standard, the Daubert Court went on to spell out the standard by
which federal courts should evaluate scientific evidence under Rule
702. The Court selected Rule 104(a) to describe the judge's responsi-
bility as a gatekeeper to review the proffered science.73 Under Rule
104(a) the judge must be convinced, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the scientific evidence is valid.74 In adopting this stan-
dard, the Court joined the chorus of voices calling for science to be
judged on the basis of scientific principles.75
The selection of Rule 104(a) might, at first, not seem a radical
departure from usual practice under the Rules. Rule 104(a) ordina-
rily applies when a fact is a prerequisite to the application of a Rule.
Under the hearsay exception for dying declarations, for example, the
judge must independently find by a preponderance of the evidence
that the statement was made under a belief of impending death.
Therefore, under the Daubert Court's view of Rule 702, scientific va-
lidity is a preliminary fact upon which the proponent of the evidence
bears the burden of proof before the judge.76
Rule 104(a), however, was not the only standard the Court might
have adopted to set the threshold for admissibility. Subsection (b) of
Rule 104 establishes a somewhat more liberal standard for reviewing
facts upon which the relevance of testimony depends. Rule 104(b)
limits the judge's threshold examination to finding that a reasonable
trier of fact could find the fact to be true.7 7 McCormick's excellent
discussion of the distinctions in application between Rules 104(a) and
(b) points out that under 104(a), "the trial judge decides with finality
those preliminary questions of fact upon which depends the admissi-
bility of an item of evidence that is objected to under an exclusionary
rule of evidence."' 78  Rule 104(b), in contrast, applies in those situa-
tions "in which the relevancy, i.e. probative value, of a fact offered
73 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
74 Id. at 2796 n.10 (footnote on distinction between reliability and validity).
75 See 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1-
6(A) (2d ed. 1993) ("The probative value of scientific evidence depends on its reliability.");
Faigman, supra note 1, at 1081 ("The legal relevance of social science research simply cannot
be divorced from its scientific credibility."); Jonakait, supra note 47, at 767 ("Testimony based
on the scientific test aids the jury if it is relevant; it is relevant only if the test is reliable.").
76 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796 n.10.
77 Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
78 MCCORMICK ET AL., supra note 50, § 53, at 137. Thus, for example, Rule 104(a) re-
quires judges independently to find under Rule 804(b)(2) that a dying declaration was made
under a belief of impending death before permitting the jury to consider the hearsay statement.
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in evidence depends on the existence of another, and preliminary,
fact." 79
The Court's choice of Rule 104(a) over 104(b) is extremely sig-
nificant in several respects. Foremost, it reflects the Court's recogni-
tion that jurors are not presumed to be capable of doing the mental
gymnastics necessary to assess both admissibility and weight; jurors
who determine that evidence is not admissible are thought, nonethe-
less, to put some weight on what they have heard.8" The more strin-
gent 104(a) standard ordinarily applies to the application of exclu-
sionary rules under circumstances when the jury cannot be expected
to make both the preliminary and ultimate findings of fact. Rule 702
presents such an instance. Jurors obligated to conduct the initial va-
lidity assessment are not able to resist the dubious message of the in-
valid science.8" Moreover, many have voiced the concern that jurors
will be overwhelmed by the aura of infallibility of scientific evidence,
8 2
and thus jurors are not expected to conduct such a preliminary assess-
ment very well. For these reasons, it is the judge who should guard
the courthouse door to ensure that only valid science is admitted. 3
The Court's selection of 104(a) also suggests an answer to a de-
bate that very quickly emerged after Daubert was announced. Court
79 Id. Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court adhere to and exemplify the distinct
provisions of Rule 104. In Bourjaily r. United States, the Court applied the 104(a) standard to
the preliminary question whether a conspiracy existed under the hearsay exclusion for the
statements of coconspirators. 483 U.S. 171, 171 (1987) (applying Rule 104(a) to Federal Rule
of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E)). Consistent with the traditional standard for preliminary fact review
for exclusionary rules of evidence, Bourjaily required judges independently to find the exist-
ence of a conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence. In Huddleston v. United States,
however, the Court did not apply the 104(a) standard to extrinsic act evidence under 404(b).
The Court found that Congress's principal concern in enacting Rule 404(b) was not exclusion,
but rather "ensuring that restrictions would not be placed on the admission of such evidence."
485 U.S. at 689. Thus, the Court read 404(b) as a rule of inclusion and applied Rule 104(b).
Id. at 687 ("Generally .... Rules [404 through 412] do not flatly prohibit the introduction of
such evidence but instead limit the purpose for which it may be introduced.").
80 See John Kaplan, Of Mabrus and Zorgs-An Essay in Honor of David Louisell, 66 CAL.
L. REV. 987, 997-99 (1978) (criticizing the California rule for giving these sorts of fact ques-
tions to jurors and praising the Federal Rules for treating them as preliminary facts to be
decided by judges).
81 As stated in Downing, "[N]ovel scientific evidence carries with it concerns over trust-
worthiness and reliability akin to those raised by offers of hearsay evidence." United States v.
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1240 n.21 (3d Cir. 1985). See generally Peter Tillers & David
Schum, Hearsay Logic, 76 MINN. L. REV. 813 (1992) (discussing the necessity of having a
theory about behavioral characteristics relevant to assessment of hearsay and in-court testimo-
nial evidence).
82 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 926 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); United States v.
Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973).
83 See United States v. Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying Rule 104(a)
to assess the validity of the data upon which the expert relied); cf. Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d
568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
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observers have sharply disagreed whether Daubert stands for a liberal
standard of admissibility or a conservative one.84 The opinion, it
seems, has language enough to satisfy everyone. On balance, how-
ever, it appears that Daubert's validity test is some distance from the
most liberal rule the Court could have adopted. Rule 104(b) would
have provided a much more generous reception to expert witnesses.
To be sure, a more conservative rule could be envisioned. An
entire section of Daubert is devoted to recognizing the generally
liberal thrust of the Rules. Of course, the Daubert Court's statements
regarding the general competency of the jury are like statements
favoring motherhood and apple pie; they are not controversial and
add little to our understanding of the outcome. In the end, the Court
situated Rule 702 along with Article VIII of the Rules (Hearsay), and
thus selected the most conservative standard that the Rules contem-
plate. Rule 104(a) provides the strongest judicial check on the vagar-
ies of scientific practice and the best safeguard against jurors being
overwhelmed by those practices.
The focus of the inquiry under Rule 104(a) is to be on the core of
the knowledge-the underlying assumptions, methods, data, and in-
ferences of the proffered expert testimony-and not on the periphery
where so much of the evaluation of expert witnesses has taken place
over many years (e.g., credentials or the views of other experts in the
same field):
The subject of an expert's testimony must be "scientific ... knowl-
edge." The adjective "scientific" implies a grounding in the meth-
ods and procedures of science. Similarly, the word "knowledge"
connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.
The term "applies to any body of known facts or to any body of
ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good
grounds." Of course, it would be unreasonable to conclude that
the subject of scientific testimony must be "known" to a certainty;
arguably, there are no certainties in science. But, in order to qual-
ify as "scientific knowledge," an inference or assertion must be de-
rived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must be
84 Compare Kenneth J. Chesebro, Taking Daubert's "Focus" Seriously. The Methodology!
Conclusion Distinction, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1745 (1994) and Anthony Z. Roisman, Conflict
Resolution in the Courts: The Role of Science, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1945 (1994) (liberal
standard) with Bert Black, The Supreme Court's View of Science: Has Daubert Exorcised the
Certainty Demon?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2129 (1994) and Clifton T. Hutchinson & Danny S.
Ashby, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Redefining the Bases for Admissibility
of Expert Scientific Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1875 (1994) (conservative standard). See
also Bert Black & John A. Singer, From Frye to Daubert: A New Test for Scientific Evidence, 1
SHEPARD'S EXPERT & Sci. EVIDENCE Q. 19 (1993); Barry J. Nace, Reaction to Daubert, I
SHEPARD'S EXPERT & Sci. EVIDENCE Q. 51 (1993).
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supported by appropriate validation .... ."
Rule 702 thus is seen to bring about a fundamental, if belated, depar-
ture from some of the most familiar ways that courts have evaluated
and admitted asserted scientific expert testimony over a great many
years. 86 In a sense, the Supreme Court has shifted control of the key
admissibility judgment from the "sellers" to an agent (the trial judge)
acting on behalf of the specific group of "buyers" who seek the knowl-
edge for the law's purposes.
4. Appellate Review of Asserted Scientific Evidence
If it is the responsibility of trial courts to make preliminary deter-
minations concerning the validity of asserted science under Rule
104(a), what part is to be played by appellate courts? The Daubert
Court did not specify the standard appellate courts should use when
reviewing a trial court's conclusions about the validity of proffered
science. Is a determination about the validity of scientific evidence
within a trial court's discretion, or is the trial court bound by an ap-
pellate court's findings on the subject? 7
The Ninth Circuit in Daubert88 held that the question of the va-
lidity of scientific information
is reviewed de novo by an appellate court, for "[t]he answer to the
question about the reliability of a scientific technique or process
does not vary according to the circumstances of each case. It is
therefore inappropriate to view this threshold question of reliabil-
ity as a matter within each trial judge's individual discretion."8 9
Although trial courts are invested with wide discretion when ap-
plying the Rules,9° significant reasons support limiting their discretion
regarding validity assessments. First, a substantial component of the
"relevance" determination under Rule 702 is legal in character. 9'
85 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795 (footnotes and citations omitted) (first ellipsis in original).
86 For example, it is hard to imagine how a conscientious federal court could now admit
testimony by certain types of forensic scientists, until there is a more satisfactory showing than
has been available to date. See Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for Regula-
tion, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 109 (1991); Risinger et al., supra note 23; Saks & Koehler, supra
note 23, at 361.
87 See generally Michael J. Saks, Judicial Attention to the Way the World Works, 75 IOWA
L. REV. 1011 (1990) (providing an integrative summary of Monahan and Walker's tripartite
theory of facts, authority, and frameworks, including analysis of when lower courts are bound
by the factual findings of higher courts).
88 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991).
89 Id. at 1130 (quoting Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 367 (Md. 1978)); see also United States
v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1197-1201 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
90 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 108 (1974).
91 "The Court has long noted the difficulty of distinguishing between legal and factual
issues." Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401 (1990); see Mark McCormick,
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Moreover, the factual component of the determination is not the
traditional case-specific adjudicative fact to which an appellate court
defers to the trial court's findings.92 Trial courts are no better situated
to assess the validity of scientific methods. 93 Such determinations do
not, for instance, depend on assessing the credibility of witnesses or
knowledge of local conditions. Indeed, judicial assessment of validity
might be better conducted through written briefs rather than oral
testimony.
Scientific methods ordinarily operate at two fact levels of the trial
process. Scientific information both transcends individual disputes
and is specific to particular disputes. 94 The de novo standard should
apply to scientific information that transcends a particular dispute.95
Such facts resemble legislative facts much more than adjudicative
facts, and appellate courts generally review legislative facts on a de
novo standard.96
An illustrative example of the law-science connection is research
on the effects of cigarette smoking on health used in litigation against
cigarette producers. A substantial body of research indicates that cig-
arette smoking significantly increases a person's risk for lung cancer.
This research transcends particular disputes and ought to be subjected
to de novo review; there is no reason to allow different courts to decide
this matter differently. 97
In addition, the plaintiff probably will offer an expert to testify
Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REV. 879, 908
(1982) (describing the question of the admissibility of novel scientific evidence as "a mixed
question of fact and law").
92 Compare Kenneth C. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (1942) (describing and contrasting adjudicative facts
and legislative facts) with Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks. A New Use of
Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 563-70 (1987) (modifying and expanding the con-
cept of adjudicative facts) [hereinafter Walker & Monahan (1987)].
93 See McCormick, supra note 91, at 909.
94 See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Es-
tablishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 490-91 (1986) [hereinafter Monahan
& Walker (1986)]; see also Imwinkelried, supra note 54, at 24-25.
95 See Dunagin v. City of Oxford, Miss., 718 F.2d 738, 748-49 n.8 (5th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984).
96 See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 900-01 n.7 (1983) (validity of predictions of
dangerousness); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 n.9 (1982) (the effect on children of
being a subject in pornographic materials); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 231 n.10 (1978)
(the effect of jury size on deliberations); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 n.31 (1976) (the
deterrent effect of capital punishment); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 n.8
(1973) (the relationship between obscenity and crime). See generally David L. Faigman, "Nor-
mative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional In-
terpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 552-56 (1991) (reviewing the role of judicial fact-finding
in the cases cited, and the role of fact-finding in judicial lawmaking).
97 Cf. United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 799 (2d Cir.) (taking judicial notice of the
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that the plaintiff's particular lung cancer was caused by cigarette
smoking.98 Such testimony has two components.99 First, it is pre-
mised upon the transcendent scientific conclusion that experts in gen-
eral can accurately draw such inferences. This scientific premise
should also be subject to a de novo standard of review. Second, it is
premised upon the conclusion that the particular witness is competent
to make such a judgment; this assessment is case specific and should
be overturned only if the trial judge abused his or her discretion in
admitting it. 1o
Application of less than a de novo standard of review to scientific
information that transcends individual cases invariably leads to incon-
sistent treatment of similarly situated claims. The validity of scientific
knowledge does not change from court to court; assessments of that
knowledge also should not change from court to court.
It would follow, then, that if scientific knowledge that transcends
particular disputes has been reviewed under Rule 702 as a matter of
law, trial courts must follow the precedent established on the issue. If
it is a matter of first impression, of course, the trial court must exer-
cise its independent legal judgment.
III. FITTING THE LEGAL PROCESS TO THE SCIENTIFIC PROCESS
The principal alternatives for evaluating the admissibility of sci-
entific expert testimony may not so much be effective and workable
solutions as they are statements of the dilemma that courts face. The
general acceptance test provides judges the option of delegating to
others the making of decisions that most judges feel ill-equipped to
make. The Daubert test places the responsibility squarely on judges
to determine whether the evidence they are admitting into trials is
general acceptance of the theory underlying DNA profiling and the general techniques used to
identify profiles), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992).
98 Not all scientific information is described at the case-specific level at trial. For example,
experts who testify on the unreliability of eyewitness identifications present only general re-
search findings indicating the factors related to errors in witnesses' perceptions. The jury is left
to draw inferences from the expert's testimony to the case before it. See, e.g., State v. Chapple,
660 P.2d 1208, 1219 (Ariz. 1983) (concluding that the fact that the expert "would testify to
general factors which were applicable to this case ... but would not express any opinion with
regard to the accuracy of the specific identification" favored admissibility). See generally
JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
346-448 (2d ed. 1990).
99 See Walker & Monahan (1987), supra note 92, at 584; see also Robert P. Mosteller,
Legal Doctrines Governing the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Concerning Social Framework
Evidence, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 85.
100 See Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 799 (leaving the reliability of the specific DNA profile used in
the case for the jury to determine).
1822 [Vol. 15:1799
HeinOnline  -- 15  Cardozo L. Rev.  1822 1993 - 1994
1994] UNDERSTANDING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
valid.'' The former seems to surrender fundamental judicial respon-
sibilities. The latter, if pursued with any rigor, seems to place on
judges a burden that few human beings can be expected to carry.
The principal failing in the legal system's approach to scientific
evidence has been courts' unwillingness to grapple with the basics of
the scientific method. Daubert is a good first step in the right direc-
tion in that it calls upon federal judges to apply the standards of sci-
ence to evaluate evidence. This is no easy assignment and it remains
to be seen how many states will follow the federal lead. Judges will
need substantial assistance and should expect to invest substantial
time if they are to successfully complete the task. At first, especially,
judges applying the validity test are likely to look to proxies for valid-
ity in making the necessary preliminary judgments. Factors such as
general acceptance, therefore, are likely to creep back into daily prac-
tice. Indeed, in some instances, proxies such as general acceptance,
publication in a peer-reviewed journal, reputation of the scientist-ex-
pert, and so on will be entirely appropriate to rely upon; scientists
themselves would do so. But not always. Ultimately, judges must
come to appreciate the complexity of scientific inquiry. They must
come to understand those questions scientists can answer and those
they cannot. This section explores the different sorts of questions
scientists address and suggests ways in which judges might come to
distinguish good science from bad science.
A. The Intersection of Law and Science
Several legal scholars have attempted to bring greater coherence
to scientific evidence by describing the structure of scientific investiga-
tions and then tailoring evidence law to that structure. The two most
notable offerings are Professor Imwinkelried's description of the syllo-
gistic structure of science 0 2 and Professors Monahan and Walker's
description of the scientific structure inherent in the empirical ques-
tions asked by legal decision makers.103 A brief detour to consider
101 One of the authors has seen the dilemma "in the flesh," so to speak, during numerous
summers of teaching scientific research methods and statistics to judges working on their
LL.M. degrees. For most of the semester they complained of and criticized the expert wit-
nesses who appeared in the cases we read and cases which they had decided. In the final week
of the semester we would turn to a body of scholarship that argued that in many circumstances
no experts were needed, but rather judges should be making the decisions themselves. The
suggestion seemed to panic many or most of the judges, and they began to insist, as it were, on
the return of the experts to help them.
102 Imwinkelried, supra note 54, at 1.
103 Monahan & Walker (1986), supra note 94, at 477; Laurens Walker & John Monahan,
Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 CAL. L. REV. 877 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter Walker & Monahan (1988)]; Walker & Monahan (1987), supra note 92, at 559.
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these ideas should be fruitful.
Professor Imwinkelried describes two levels of science that enter
the courtroom and must be assessed by legal decision makers.
Imwinkelried distinguishes between the general research and theories
of science (the major premise), and the case-specific information that
informs the expert's particular opinion (the minor premise). °4
Although written before Daubert, Imwinkelried's approach to the ad-
missibility determination for these two premises is instructive. He ar-
gues that courts should scrutinize the minor premise under Rule 703,
but should defer to the expert's better judgment regarding the accu-
racy of the major premise pursuant to Rule 702.105 Imwinkelried ex-
plains that the reason for this deference is that the greater complexity
of the major premise compels deference to the expert's knowledge. 106
Professors Monahan and Walker approach the problem of scien-
tific evidence with a sophisticated model that incorporates the nature
of the legal question asked with the nature of the scientific answer. 1 7
The first level of convergence between science and law, social author-
ity, does not implicate the rules of evidence. It refers to research that
is relevant to the determination of legislative facts and the resulting
formulation of legal rules. 08 At a second level of the Monahan-
Walker model, what they term social facts, scientific research might
be relevant to adjudicative facts.'09 According to the model, the re-
search methods used in the investigation would be reviewable by the
judge and any results obtained from a valid methodology would be
presented to. the jury through expert testimony. Finally, the third
level pertains to cases where scientific research might have relevance
as a combination of social authority and social fact; they label this
aspect of the model social frameworks."' In a social framework,
some issue in the particular dispute is claimed to be an instance of a
104 Imwinkelried, supra note 54, at 2-3.
105 Id. at 14-19.
106 Id. at 9-10. For an argument refuting this insight, see David L. Faigman, Struggling to
Stop the Flood of Unreliable Expert Testimony, 76 MINN. L. REv. 877, 886-89 (1992).
107 Walker & Monahan (1988), supra note 103, at 886-87.
108 Monahan & Walker (1986), supra note 94, at 490-91. According to their proposal, sci-
entific authority is analogous to legal authority. Judges should consider such scientific "prece-
dent" (i.e., past research) as presented in briefs and arguments, and sua sponte. The
information found to be relevant and valid would then be incorporated into the judge's conclu-
sions of law. Id. at 495-98.
109 Walker & Monahan (1988), supra note 103, at 881; see, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers
Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 690-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (utilizing a consumer survey to deter-
mine the degree of public confusion in recognizing cigarette lighters manufactured by the
plaintiff and defendant).
I 10 Walker & Monahan (1987), supra note 92, at 568-71.
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general scientific finding or theory." I' The judge, under the model,
would consider and instruct the jury on the verity of the general
claim, but the jury would also hear expert testimony on the theory's
applicability to the case before it.
Neither the Imwinkelried nor the Monahan-Walker conception
of the scientific enterprise provides a straightforward solution to the
complexities of scientific evidence under Daubert. First, Imwin-
kelried's description of the syllogistic structure of science, though
generally accurate, oversimplifies the assessment process that the law
must bring to scientific research. Inherent in the social framework
and social fact components of the Monahan-Walker model are at least
three levels of the scientific enterprise-not two-that are of relevance
to legal decision makers. The Monahan-Walker model, while truly an
innovative vision, gives little guidance under the Daubert standard.
Foremost, judges are unlikely to assume the full range of responsibili-
ties that are created by the social framework and social fact compo-
nents of the model. Moreover, the model offers no guidance
regarding the threshold standard that divides responsibility between
the judge and jury for evaluating scientific evidence.
Nonetheless, whatever the shortcomings or limitations of the Im-
winkelried and Monahan-Walker approaches, their basic insights are
essential to any viable strategy for evaluating scientific evidence. The
structure of the next section's analysis rests on much of this path-
breaking work.
B. The Structure of Science
Three levels of scientific thinking must be considered in assessing
the validity of any scientific expert opinion.112 First, at the top of the
abstraction hierarchy, is "the theory or principle that provides au-
thority for the conclusions that are drawn from the data."'"1 3 This
"theory or principle" is the most abstract of the concepts in the hier-
archy of validation of scientific evidence, and is, as a consequence,
often the most difficult level for the nonscientist to understand. It is
II' Id.
112 William A. Thomas, Some Observations by a Scientist, 115 F.R.D. 142, 144 (1986).
113 Id. at 144. A scientific theory is the result of the scientific method; that is, it is a hypoth-
esis that has undergone testing numerous times and by numerous methods and has, so far, not
been completely falsified. A hypothesis (and the resulting theory) is a model or mental picture
of how and why a certain natural system or process works. A theory is therefore not a "fact"
in the sense that it is an absolute truth; instead, it is a well-established and respected model for
the true system. See ERNEST NAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE: PROBLEMS IN THE
LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 15-46 (1961); KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIEN-
TIFIC DISCOVERY (rev. ed. 1968).
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likely that this level was the one on which the court in Frye was deal-
ing, and for this reason, deferred to "general acceptance" in establish-
ing the standard.'14 One example of "theories or principles" at this
level is the notion that the physical characteristics of all living things
are determined by DNA and that each person's DNA is unique and
uniquely defines that individual. " Another example is the belief that
a person's truthfulness is reflected in his breathing rate, temperature,
and blood pressure. 1 6
That these theories be well established is vital to the validity of
the ultimate data presented in a particular court. Because this level is
the most abstract and difficult, however, its admissibility has often
been left to the "experts" or ignored altogether.
The second level is "the general technique or procedure that pro-
duces the data." ' 1 7 This level is often confused with the more abstract
"theory" level. Indeed, the legal test intended for the "theory" level
of our hierarchy has most often been used to determine the admissibil-
ity of the "general technique" instead. Examples of general tech-
niques or procedures include the laboratory procedure developed to
extract and study DNA and the actual polygraph technique of meas-
uring a person's blood pressure, temperature, and so on while he is
being questioned.
It is essential to differentiate this middle level of science from the
other two. It is possible, for instance, that an underlying theory is
based on sound scientific testing, but that the technique used to pro-
duce the data is not reliable or produces invalid results. For instance,
even though the theory that DNA is unique to an individual may be
scientifically valid, the technique presented for admission into court
may not accurately or reproducibly separate DNA into "bands" by
which it can be compared from one individual to another. Con-
versely, the technique used may be reliable, but because the underly-
ing theory is invalid, results from the technique would also be invalid.
This is illustrated by the handwriting identification test sponsored by
the Forensic Sciences Foundation." I8 In a proficiency test, all of the
"experts" agreed on an identification, indicating that the technique
they were using resulted in reproducible and, therefore, reliable re-
sults. However, all of them were incorrect, possibly because the un-
114 See Thomas, supra note 112, at 142.
'15 See, e.g., United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104
(1992).
116 JOHN E. REID & FRED E. INBAu, TRUTH AND DECEPTION: THE POLYGRAPH ("LIE-
DETECTOR") TECHNIQUE 1-3 (1966).
117 Thomas, supra note 112, at 144.
1 18 See generally NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 71.
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derlying theory, that a person's handwriting is unique and cannot be
disguised, is not scientifically valid.
Further, the general technique or procedure must be distin-
guished from the procedure that was actually performed to produce
the data that are to be introduced into evidence. A general technique
can be "proven"-that is, many laboratories may have used it, dem-
onstrating that reproducible results are possible. This is not to say,
however, that the laboratory or the technician that produced the data
in the specific case at bar is reliable. Thus, the second level, although
less abstract than the first, is still more abstract than the third.
The third and most concrete level is "the specific practices used
to obtain the data." '19 As noted above, this level does not involve
whether a technique, in the abstract, can produce reliable and valid
data, but whether it produced reliable and valid data in this case.
Thus, even though the scientific theory underlying a technique may be
valid, and the technique can and does produce reliable and valid re-
sults when used by experienced and knowledgeable technicians, the
actual data produced in the specific case may be unreliable. This
might happen in a variety of ways. The "technician" might have been
poorly trained or not trained at all. An equipment failure, or failure
of the technician to properly calibrate the instrument, could result in
invalid results. In addition, even if the equipment works perfectly, the
technician or scientist in a specific case may misinterpret the results.
Even where reliable and valid results are possible and previously have
been relied on, the circumstances surrounding production of those
data in the particular case at bar may render those data invalid and
thus inadmissible.
The first two levels have received considerable, though somewhat
confused, attention in cases and commentaries. 121 The third has re-
ceived virtually none. The first two levels transcend particular cases,
are analogous to law, and seem to lend themselves to appellate or
legislative control; the third more closely resembles case-specific find-
ings of fact. 12 All three levels must be found valid in order for the
testimony to be valid. If any level is not valid, the end product likely
will lack validity. The standard for admissibility should account for
all three levels in order that the testimony be relevant, authentic, and
helpful.
Look again at the language of the Frye test:
[W]hile courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony
119 Id.
120 See Thomas, supra note 112, at 144.
121 Cf. Imwinkelried, supra note 54; Walker & Monahan (1987), supra note 92.
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deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the
thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently estab-
lished to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs.122
The language of this passage suggests that the court was referring to
the first of the three levels, the basic scientific principles on which the
technique was based. However, most cases and commentaries refer to
the Frye test as applying to a scientific technique.123 But application
is really the second, more concrete, level. The validity of the scientific
theory often is assumed or lumped together with the general tech-
nique or process; or, alternatively, the second level is simply assumed
to be met when an expert offers an opinion at the case-specific level.
Frequently, science answers only a part of the pertinent question
well enough to assist the trier of fact. Part of the court's preliminary
responsibility in deciding admissibility, therefore, is to determine the
specific question that the data answer. The availability of data at one
level of the pertinent legal category should not operate as a blank
check that permits the expert to offer any opinion she is paid to con-
clude. However, once the court has divided the scientific question
into its component parts-general theory, general application, and
specific application-the tools it uses to assess these parts might very
well differ.
1. The Underlying Theory
The first question, then, is how a court is to assess the underlying
scientific theory. Is this the level of evaluation where a general ac-
ceptance test could be most effectively and workably applied? A ma-
jor problem overlooked in the courts' application of Frye has been
that they have confused the first and second levels described above. 24
As noted, the language of the Frye opinion suggests that the court
intended the test to apply to the underlying scientific theory, not to a
technique applying that theory. A general acceptance test might be
useful, but only to evaluate the scientific theory that underlies the
technique that underlies the testimony.' 25
122 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (emphasis added).
123 See, e.g., Giannelli, supra note 26, at 189.
124 The National Academy of Sciences pointed this out in its report on voice spectrography.
See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 71, at 41.
125 Harking back to our marketplace metaphor, where general acceptance may place a legal
judgment at the control of those selling what is being judged, applying general acceptance to
basic theoretical knowledge, instead of technique, lessens this risk. This lower risk (to con-
tinue the metaphor) results from the probability that many different sellers' guilds, often with
competing intellectual and professional interests, will have studied a theory. Agreement
among competitors should increase the courts' confidence.
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Determining the validity of a scientific theory, as previously men-
tioned, is perhaps the most difficult task for a court. Daubert requires
the judge to independently evaluate the validity of proffered scientific
evidence. The first step should be, therefore, to determine the validity
of the scientific theory-the first level.
The Daubert Court mentioned several factors to assess the valid-
ity of scientific evidence, including the possible use of a general ac-
ceptance test. 126 It is our contention that the general acceptance test
is most appropriately used at this most abstract level; other factors
mentioned by the Court could be helpful as well.
Evaluation of a theory's validity should be informed by the larg-
est and widest array of empirical and theoretical literature, and from
a relatively broad array of disciplines.'27 A sincere attempt to evalu-
ate a serious scientific theory, if not a career, is at least the work of a
graduate program. The "relevant scientific community" which must
accept the theory should be a large and diverse group. 128 In order to
insure that the scientific data admitted by the court have sufficient
corroboration to be considered valid, great care should be taken that
this community not be comprised only of persons who have applied
the theory and developed the technology, or who serve primarily as
laboratory technicians and expert witnesses.
A general acceptance test that requires a truly relevant scientific
community will render evidence regarding some of the most common
forensic techniques suspect. Many of these "forensic sciences," such
as handwriting analysis, toolmarks, and even the study of the
scratches left from rifling on bullets, are generally accepted only by
workers whose livelihoods and careers depend on the technique. In
order to be generally accepted, in our view, the theory underlying
such a technique must be accepted by those who have less of a stake
in the outcome. One way to accomplish this would be to subject the
theory to rigorous testing by those outside the immediate field.
Another indication, although not an entirely reliable one, is
whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication.
As pointed out by the Daubert Court, publication does not necessarily
correspond with reliability. However, although the presence of peer
review does not guarantee valid science, the absence of peer review is
a definite warning sign to the user. Of course, theories that have little
126 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97.
127 At least broader than will be the case for any given technique.
128 Such as that commissioned by the National Academy of Sciences to study voice spec-
trography. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 71.
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support can in turn provide little support. Well-refuted theories can
provide no support.
Not all expert testimony, however, is based on a technique, a
technology, or a belief that is based on a well-developed and well-
tested scientific theory. While the toxic relationship between some
substances and human illness is well understood in terms of their
chemistry and biology, 129 others are far less so.1 30 Some techniques
are frankly "empirical."' 13 1 Others seem to stand on the flimsiest of
theoretical scaffolding.13 2
The lack of theory need not be disqualifying, but in the eyes of
most scientists, less understanding of the nature of a phenomenon
translates to less confidence in the phenomenon. Courts should exer-
cise similar caution. The lack of theory should increase doubt. Espe-
cially strong evidence of the validity of the technique or the empirical
relationships would be needed to make up for the lack of theoretical
supports.
2. General Application of the Theory
The second level of evaluation is the general technique, proce-
dure, relationship, or other application that follows from the theoreti-
cal knowledge. As discussed above, the Frye test has traditionally,
and incorrectly, been used to assess the validity of this level of in-
quiry. It is our contention that elements from the Federal Rules of
Evidence, as well as factors discussed in Daubert, give a judge the
proper tools to evaluate a technique at this level.
Even if the theory that underlies a technique is found to be valid,
any given application from that theory may not be. Moreover, it is
likely that fewer people from a smaller variety of fields will have scru-
tinized the technique. Here the court can have even less trust in gen-
eral acceptance, and a greater need to scrutinize the technique. At the
129 E.g., atropine, cyanide, and nicotine.
130 Fire coral, sea urchin, and stonefish, for example, are known to be toxic, but the mecha-
nisms are not understood. New compounds, including pharmaceuticals, must be tested to
determine their safety or toxicity.
131 For example, a biomedical test may have been proven capable of predicting the likeli-
hood of acquiring a certain disease, or a psychological test may have been shown to be a
reliable predictor of who will be able to perform certain tasks, but no theory has been devel-
oped and tested to make deeper sense of the empirical findings.
132 For example, all forensic identification sciences (handwriting, toolmarks, fingerprints,
etc.) rest on the "theory" that "nature never repeats"; that is, that no two objects, natural or
manufactured, ever occur that are so similar they are indistinguishable. This theory is based
on little more than the faith of those who subscribe to it. Michael J. Saks, Implications of the
Daubert Test for Forensic Identification Science, 1 SHEPARD'S EXPERT & Sci. EVIDENCE Q.
427 (1994).
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same time, the task is made more manageable because less informa-
tion exists for the court to review than would exist if it were trying to
evaluate a well and widely established theory.
In what is likely to become controversial language, the Daubert
Court asserted that the test of admissibility queried the methodology
and reasoning of the research, not its conclusions. 13 3 The meaning of
this statement is unclear. Scientists do not distinguish so precisely
between methodology and conclusion; the latter is an integral func-
tion of the former. Conclusions are accepted because a sound meth-
odology was employed. They are not matters of "truth" or "falsity."
As the Court itself pointed out, science is a continual process of test-
ing and attempting to falsify hypotheses. 3 1 Scientists accept a hy-
pothesis (i.e., find it corroborated), because their attempts to falsify it
have failed. The conclusion, acceptance, or rejection of the hypothe-
sis of interest is intertwined, inextricably, with the methods and
reasoning.
Alternatively, the Court might have meant that the "conclusion"
to be left to the trier of fact refers to the application of the theory in
the particular case. Yet, as already noted, there are two levels of ap-
plication that must be distinguished. For example, in Daubert itself,
the principal issue involved the relationship between Bendectin and
birth defects. This issue, as we have seen, divides into three levels of
scientific inquiry. The first level concerns the general theoretical con-
nection between Bendectin and birth defects. The second, more con-
crete issue, concerns whether, as a general matter, doctors can
identify when specific birth defects are traceable to Bendectin. And,
finally, the most concrete issue concerns the correctness of the diagno-
sis that the plaintiffs' birth defects were caused by the drug.
Arguably, both the general application and specific application
levels might be swept into the Court's "conclusion" category. This
would be unfortunate. The helpfulness of a particular expert's testi-
mony depends not merely on a valid general theory, but on research
demonstrating that it is possible to apply this theory to concrete cases.
An example from the social sciences illustrates why this is so.
Social scientists have invested substantial research time studying
eyewitness identification and have uncovered a host of factors that
interfere with accurate eyewitness identifications. Despite this consid-
erable work, researchers are not able, and do not pretend to be able, to
determine whether a particular witness's identification was accurate.
133 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797 ("The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and
methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.").
134 Id. at 2796.
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Such an opinion is beyond their expertise. Sometimes, scientists can-
not answer all of the scientific questions the law poses.
Inevitably, when the law asks scientific questions, there is no
shortage of "experts" available to offer an answer. Indeed, in a wide
range of cases, "scientific" opinions are offered into evidence with lit-
tle or no empirical research data behind them. In many areas of psy-
chology, psychiatry, medicine, and the sundry forensic sciences,
experts offer opinions about case-specific facts that are based on little
more than a general study of the phenomenon, an interview with the
subject (maybe), and an educated guess. These "clinical judgments"
do not qualify as science in the absence of empirical evidence which
generally indicates the practitioners have the ability to make the par-
ticular sorts of judgments in which they claim an expertise. In most
cases, these judgments could be tested for their accuracy, but the req-
uisite data simply are not yet available.
Given the Daubert Court's insistence that trial judges examine
the data upon which an expert bases an opinion, experts offering
clinical judgments have two approaches available to them. First, they
could collect data that would validate their ability to draw the partic-
ular conclusion they seek to offer. Alternatively, they could rede-
scribe their enterprise as nonscientific and claim a right to testify as
"specialists," because Daubert speaks to only part of Rule 702-ex-
perts offering scientific knowledge. Rule 702 also permits expert opin-
ion on "technical or other specialized knowledge."
Courts should not permit this form of revisionism. The issue
that courts must resolve in determining whether an expert falls within
Daubert is whether the "expert" knowledge upon which the witness is
relying is testable. Thus, for instance, expert opinion about the mar-
ket value of a painting is testable, whereas expert opinion about the
artistic value of a painting is not. The former expert must show that
an empirical basis supports her opinion. The latter might have to
demonstrate only a particular educational background.
Judges' failure to query the empirical basis for clinical judgments
would eviscerate the Daubert rule. All pseudoscience can be rede-
scribed as specialized knowledge; expert opinion based on the
research of Steven King will be as welcome as that based on the re-
search of Stephen Hawking. Daubert establishes a principled stan-
dard by which to measure the probative value of scientific opinion.
The challenge now before the courts is to apply that standard to pro-
duce the most reliable result.
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3. Case-Specific Application
The Daubert Court's statement that the methodology and rea-
soning is the correct focus, not "the conclusions that they generate,"
appears to be directed at the case-specific application of science.' 3 5
Under Daubert, therefore, a trial court must assess the validity of the
general theory as well as the capability to draw specific conclusions.
If the data support these first two levels of science, the validity of the
specific conclusion drawn in the particular case will be for the trier of
fact to determine. This does not mean, however, that judges have no
role in supervising experts' case-specific conclusions. 3 6 Although
Rule 104(a) does not apply to these determinations, other evidentiary
rules continue to play an important role in regulating the admission of
such evidence, most notably, Rule 403.
The evaluation at the case-specific level should be guided, of
course, by the relevancy rules, with special attention paid to Rule 403.
Traditionally, courts have commended scientific data to the jury with
the holding that any question about validity of the specific data "goes
to weight, not admissibility."'' 3 7 While seemingly accurate, this total
abdication is unacceptable under basic conceptions of relevance. If
data are invalid, they will not assist the trier of fact, although data
presented by a scientist with impressive-sounding credentials have the
potential to be believed simply because of those credentials. We
therefore suggest that this level of inquiry lends itself to analysis
under Rule 403.
Rule 403 involves balancing the probative value of the evidence
against the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of
misleading the jury. These factors are exactly those that present
themselves when an apparently eminent scientist presents faulty data.
The jury, generally unsophisticated in science, is in danger of being
swayed by the credentials or impressiveness of the witness rather than
the true worth of the data. The judge must step in to ensure that the
specific data are sufficiently valid that their probative value is not sub-
stantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.
The specific inquiry undertaken by the judge on this level of anal-
ysis can include a wide range of factors. Assuming, of course, that the
first two levels of analysis indicate that a tested scientific theory exists,
and that the general technique utilized is considered potentially relia-
135 Id. at 2797. The third level of evaluation of scientific validity is the most neglected by
the courts.
136 Id. at 2796-97.
137 United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 559 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Smith, 776
F.2d 892, 898 (10th Cir. 1985).
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ble, the specifics of the actual data produced for admission in court
must be examined. We suggest that the factors to be considered in
this examination include the following:
(1) The credentials and experience of the technician performing
the actual procedure used to produce the data. An inexperienced
or poorly-trained technician should alert the court to the possibil-
ity of flaws in the data. In addition, the court should look to the
technician's understanding of the underlying process. Any techni-
cian who does not understand how or why the process works pro-
duces inherently suspect data.
(2) The specifics of data collection for the data set presented. An
examination of lab notebooks or other evidence should show that
equipment was properly maintained, properly calibrated, and
properly used. Factors that might affect the result (e.g., tempera-
ture or concentration of the solution) should be consistent, and any
variation in one of these factors should indicate a possible problem.
(3) The general reputation and track record of the laboratory that
produced the data. Ideally, labs should submit themselves to peri-
odic "blind" testing by impartial agencies. If the lab in question
has not been so tested, it may be required to receive "blind" sam-
ples for analysis to demonstrate the lab's ability to produce reliable
data. Any finding that a lab has a significant error rate should
render the lab's data suspect.
(4) The specifics of collection of any samples that were used to
produce the data. Again, lab or field notebooks can be examined to
determine whether any contamination of the samples occurred, or
whether the chain of custody subsequently allowed tampering or
contamination to occur.
(5) The extent to which the technique relies on the interpretation
of an "expert." Interpretive data should be highly suspect if the
expert has a vested interest in the outcome, or has been shown to
have made mistakes in other cases. This is another area in which
"blind" submission of samples is very useful in determining
whether a given expert can produce reliable and valid results.
Any indication that the specific data may be unreliable should
weigh against admissibility under a 403 analysis.
CONCLUSION
The analysis in Daubert, together with the suggested analysis
here, will render the consideration of scientific data rather daunting to
many judges. It is, however, vitally important that a rigorous and
thorough analysis of scientific data be undertaken before those data
are admitted into court. This task is made difficult because of the
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general lack of scientific literacy among Americans, including lawyers
and judges.
When a case becomes especially difficult or complex, the court
may need to employ an independent expert or special master to evalu-
ate the science on any or all of the three levels indicated in this Arti-
cle. It should be emphasized that it is not always necessary for the
judge to become an expert in the particular field; it is only necessary
that the judge be convinced that the data presented are sufficiently
valid to pass muster under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
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